Many activities in which these transnational social spaces are embodied have already been the subjects of geographical studies, such as media (Charef 1999) and development (Lacroix 2005) networks between places of origin and places of settlement. In this paper, I shall focus on the political dimension of these spaces and,
especially, on what we can call political transnationalism.
This term generally designates the political involvement of migrants in their country of origin and, reciprocally, the sending countries' governmental support or opposition in Morocco became a massive workforce provider in the mid-sixties, when domestic political struggles were reaching an apex. Until the eighties, emigration was similar to a safety valve which allowed to weaken political unrest. For this reason, it could be described as an 'exit' from a declining system system, in terms of personal satisfaction (Hirschman 1970) . According to the first version of Hirschman theoretical framework, the easier the exit from a territory, the weaker the 'voice', the ability to protest against the system's failures inside this very territory. Migrants' political transnationalism modifies quite drastically this scenario, as exit and voice could go all together. As Faist (2000, p. 321) 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 demonstrate that, until the nineties, the Moroccan state did not develop an effective policy towards its emigrants, who were and still are largely excluded from the Moroccan political system, but also discouraged to become political actors in the country of settlement.
In the last three sections, I describe some major past and present Moroccan migrants organizations as collective answers to solve these difficulties. Citizenship is not only perceived as a set of rights and duties, but also as a sense of belonging to a political community, by assuming various roles in the society : neighbour, parent, user of public services or worker are some of them. Looking at concrete practices of citizenship, embedded in places, spaces and networks allows me to identify three historical forms of Moroccan political transnationalism.
The first one emerged from the convergence, from the sixties to the eighties, of
Moroccan leftism and French trade-union and gathers migrants as 'Moroccan workers (or students) in France'. The second form, emerging in the nineties at national level with a little help from both states, is related to organizations claiming to represent Moroccan migrants as muslims. Finally, the third form includes all organizations whose members express a 'French-Moroccan' identity. In the fifth section, I take one of these organizations as representative of the others' characteristics and difficulties. These three forms of organization are places where we can observe the persistent tension between the Moroccan state-sponsored long distance nationalism and the migrants' desire for autonomy. 
Candidates and representatives of Moroccan origin in two cities of Western France
There is Moroccan nationality. We could have 36 000 nationalities, we will still be Moroccans.
When we go back to Morocco, we put our French identity card away and it is no use to 
Beyond borders, still Moroccan ? Representing migrants as Moroccan citizens.
Until recently, the Moroccan state was restraining integration and naturalization of its expatriates in France, without having a real policy for them (paragraph 21). Moroccan political parties did not engage a real campaign to change this situation, but some migrants organizations developed transnational strategies to enter the Moroccan political system (paragraph 22).
An extra-territorial conception of nationhood without an effective external citizenship
Legally, Moroccan migrants' allegiance is firstly based on their preserving of Moroccan nationality and its transmission to their foreign-born children, all the more so since, according to legal experts, the loss of the nationality is not allowed by Moroccan laws.
Secondly, since 1999, King Mohammed VI has kept on emphasizing migrants' place in the national community. Like his father, King Hassan II, he defends an extra-territorial conception of the national allegiance based on religion, as the Alaouite dynasty is answered to a large mobilization of migrants organizations.
Absentee voting rights and Moroccan political parties in France
In the late nineties, many migrants organizations brought the absentee's vote as a major but also to protest against their exclusion from the Moroccan political system. These strategies are not new, but result from a history of struggles which began in the sixties.
Representing Moroccan migrants as temporary workers or students in France
Until the early eighties, most Moroccan migrants were concerned with homeland politics and were quite dynamic in French trade-union activism (Withol de Wenden et al. 1999, p. 59) . They were represented as temporary workers or, on a lower level, as students, both by autonomous (paragraphs 31, 32 and 34) and remote-controlled organizations (paragraph 33). This class identity mobilizing in France echoed political struggles in Morocco. 
Remote control and the Friendship societies of Moroccan workers and merchants

The Association of Moroccan Workers of France (1981-2000)
Firstly based around Paris in Argenteuil, Gennevilliers, Boulogne-Billancourt and Mantes-la-Jolie, the ATMF offices turned out to be places where exiles and migrant workers could meet. These two types of migrants shared common features, such as under-waged situation, housing problems or xenophobia. In 1979-1980, the core activity During these strikes, specific claims were sustained, such as equal wages between foreigners and French workers, the right to return free in Morocco for holidays or the right to have a prayer room inside factories. This last claim was put aside by the socialist French Prime Minister, who denounced 'manipulation of migrants by groups and movements which have nothing to do with the French reality.' On the contrary, the ATMF encouraged Moroccans to join French unions and become assimilated within the host society, even if the idea of returning home was still in most migrants' minds.
To conclude on these autonomous organizations and their will to represent all Moroccan migrants, I would like to stress a paradox. On the one hand, they claimed to represent 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 
The National Federation of Muslims of France (1985)
Moroccan migrants are estimated to be some of the most practising muslims in and urban sense of belonging, seem to be much more autonomous than the UOIF, whose financial links with Saudi Arabia are quite strong. 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 'What we want is to spread the culture of elections inside people's mind. We do not In other words, CNMF members seem to be politically active on both French and Moroccan public spheres. It became a sort of diasporic lobby rather than a voluntary association, as migrants' participation is still at a low level. Furthermore, the fact that some members of the CNMF, including its president, are also members of local mosques, sometimes controlled by the FNMF, has made its transnational identity closer to a Moroccan muslim identity than to a French-Moroccan one, despite its logo, which represents both French and Moroccan flags inside the French territory.
The French Council of Muslim Faith (2003)
Conclusion
Moroccan political transnationalism is not a new phenomenon in France, as some
Moroccan migrants began to transnationally organize themselves in the early sixties.
Particular places have embodied this political transnationalism since that time.
Factories, mosques, shops, consulates, universities and deprived urban districts are some of these places, not necessary located where Moroccan migrants are concentrated.
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